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Foreword
Communications and media in the
USSR and Eastern Europe
Kristin Roth‑Ey and Larissa Zakharova
1 Communications in socialist Europe have long been associated first and foremost with
propaganda. The USSR—the world’s first “propaganda state,” to use Peter Kenez’s term
— established a radical  new communications order that  would be widely emulated.
“The Bolshevik regime,” wrote Kenez in an influential 1985 study, “was the first not
merely to set itself propaganda goals but also through political education to aim to
create a new humanity suitable for living in a new society.”1 Propaganda, in this sense,
had no strictly delimited “political” sphere of operation in the Soviet/socialist context ;
on the contrary, it was embedded in all aspects of cultural, social, and economic life.
Propaganda was also, it bears emphasizing, devoid of dismissive (“mere propaganda”)
and negative (propaganda‑as‑brainwashing) connotations in the new lexicon—at least
when applied to the socialist context. Propaganda in socialist hands was celebrated as
an essential,  progressive  tool  of  socialist  modernity.  Communications  in  support  of
propaganda  diffusion—from  the  early  agitpoezdy and  posters  to  publishing  and
broadcasting, film, theater, and so on—received major support from the hard‑pressed
“propaganda state.”2
2 Beyond the Soviet Union, the relationship between propaganda and public, or popular,
opinion3 has  preoccupied  observers  since  at  least  the1920s,  when  thousands  of
foreigners travelled East to learn what made the socialist state and society tick, and
when the Soviets  themselves  began an expansive  and,  in  many regards,  innovative
program of cultural diplomacy.4 The question of whether Soviet propaganda “worked”
was thus a foundational one in the West, invested with hopes and fears alike. As the
cold war heated up in the late 1940s, the problem of propaganda— now often discussed
in  terms  of  state‑sponsored  “psychological”  (or  “political”)  warfare—  gained  even
greater force.5 The main lines of what would later be dubbed a “totalitarian” school in
Soviet studies presented a model of the Soviet regime as resting on the dual pillars of
propaganda and repression or, in Lenin’s terms, “on a balance between coercion and
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persuasion.”6 The growing atomization of society—the suppression of horizontal ties of
communication and enforced dependence upon vertical ones—was said to guarantee
the persuasive power of Soviet propaganda. In this way, a tool initially designed to
promote social cohesion corroded social bonds, an instrument of enlightenment was in
fact a weapon of manipulation, immobilization, and pacification.
3 The opening of the archives in the 1990s shattered whatever image of a Soviet society
utterly pacified and atomized had endured. But in truth, the so‑called “totalitarian”
school was always far less one‑dimensional than its contemporary reputation implies.
The  work  of  social  scientists  Alex  Inkeles  and  Raymond  Bauer  (from  the  Harvard
Project on the Soviet Social System), to take one example, makes liberal use of terms
like  “indoctrination,”  “conformity,”  and  “control” ;  indeed,  the  title  of  their
best‑known study, The Soviet Citizen : Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society, puts the offending
term “totalitarian” front and center.7 Yet for all that, to read Inkeles and Bauer is not to
get the sense of a brutalized and brainwashed Soviet mass, but rather of a dynamic,
even demanding population. (Their use of the term “citizen” is worth emphasizing.)
Inkeles and Bauer note repeatedly the extent to which Soviet citizens support core
socialist ideas (such as a welfare state) and illiberal values (restrictions on freedom of
expression,  for  example).  These  Soviet  orientations  are  broadly  attributed  to  the
impact of the “communications system” : their answer to the perennial question “does
Soviet propaganda work ?” was in this sense “yes,” and they made it clear that they did
not approve. We may, if we wish, judge them for their judgment. But Inkeles and Bauer,
however partisan,  were also able  to  detect  and report  on the many ways in which
Soviet communications did not work—or at least not in any simplistic, “transmission
belt” model of Leninist theory. Soviet citizens were, they said, capable of evaluating
media messages and sizing up their leaders’ commitment to them. 
4 What  Inkeles  and  Bauer  thought  they  saw  in  the  Soviet  Union  was  a  modern and
modernizing society that had much in common with other modern societies, meaning
institutions like mass higher education and mass media, but also values—an emphasis
on personal well‑being and peer‑orientation. It was a theme picked up and developed
by  other  social  scientists  in  the  1960s,  70s,  and  ‘80s,  mostly  importantly,  Ellen
Mickiewicz,  whose  pioneering  studies  of  Soviet  media  portrayed  a  complex  and
sometimes contradictory communications system in relation to an equally complex and
restive  audience.8 The  terms  of  reference  may  have  remained  the  same
—“indoctrination,”  “malleability”  and  so  on—but  the  image  of  Soviet  society  was
anything but static, as was that of communications and media. In 1990, S. Frederick
Starr, a historian, analyzed the Soviet communications system in the tradition of the
centralizing  autocratic  Russian  state,  using  the  familiar  horizontal/vertical
framework : Soviet leaders, like their tsarist predecessors, promoted vertical ties and
suppressed horizontal  ones.  But critically,  Starr also showed how wide of the mark
Soviet communications had been—how ineffective, that is, at both tasks and, above all,
the suppression of horizontal ties, which, he noted, grew increasingly difficult with the
political,  sociological,  and technological shifts of the post‑Stalinist era.9 In this way,
studies  ostensibly  focussed  on  propaganda  opened  avenues  to  research  on  the
complexity of communications practices and the plurality of media publics in the USSR.
5 The opening of the archives helped to further develop the idea of the vitality of Soviet
society,  including its  communications practices,  long before 1953.  Studies  of  letters
written to the authorities and to the press have demonstrated that, even under Stalin,
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vertical communications operated not only from top to bottom, from regime to mass,
but  also  in  the  opposite  direction.10 Horizontal,  or  interpersonal,  communication,
however, has attracted less scholarly interest.11 This special issue seeks to fill this gap
and  to  address  the  variety  of  different  forms  of  communication  in  the  USSR  and
socialist Europe. 
6 With the new material and approaches now available, historians can question anew the
fundamentals of social life in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Above all, we are interested
in  examining  the  nature  and  characteristics  of  social  bonds,  defined  as  forms  of
solidarity and cohesion that exist in every society, with or without the mediation of
state structures.12 Communications practices (both direct  and mediated)  can offer a
prism through which to evaluate the strength of social ties and understanding. And to
do this, we need to take account of what our historical actors tell us and consider their
words as forms of engagement, rather than dissimulation. 
7 To be sure, the very fact of the Bolsheviks’ monopoly on communications has had a
powerful and, some might say, distorting effect on the way scholars have conceived of
Soviet society and public opinion. For one, the orchestrated, didactic nature of Soviet
media (what Jeffrey Brooks called a “performative” public culture) meant that many
scholars long wrinkled their noses at media sources as unreal and unreliable—void of
valid  information  about  society,  particularly  for  the  Stalin  period.13 It  is  the
authoritarian regime itself, with its aim to present a wholly unified society, that put
historians in this bind. And as a result, the historiography has tended to cluster around
two poles : the first, a mirror image of the regime’s own ideal of unity, but with the
values reversed (yes, there was unity : everyone secretly resisted, as in Sarah Davies’s
work)14 and the second, a portrait of the regime as having been largely successful in its
efforts  to  construct  a  unified Soviet  worldview (as  in the work of  Jochen Hellbeck,
Jeffrey Brooks and, in their way, “modernization” school social scientists like Inkeles
and  Bauer).15 Yet  the  categories  of  “resistance”  and  “support,”  or  “belief”  and
“disbelief,” are in themselves inadequate to the task of analyzing authoritarian socialist
societies.  The  majority  of  people  made  their  lives  between the  poles  and occupied
varied positions in relation to them over the course of a lifetime.
8 In recent years, the burgeoning literature on the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras has
had the diversity of the socialist experience, the multiplicity of its social milieux, and
the  ambiguity  of  its  public  culture  as  guiding  themes.16 It  is  true  that  the  major
sociological  shifts  of  the post‑Stalinist  era (urbanization and rising living standards
chief among them) played a critical role here. But diversity of experience and opinion
was not limited to the post‑Stalinist era. By the same token, the loss of the constative
dimension of official discourse with Stalin’s death did not signal the end to all popular
engagement with the values of the regime : as Alexei Yurchak has demonstrated, it was
possible  to  be  at  once  a  Komsomol  member  and  a  heavy  metal  fan.17 We  need  to
confront  the  epistemological  challenge  of  seeing  unanimity  everywhere  and
understand  that  a  multiplicity  of  opinions  is  not  only  to  be  found  in  democratic
regimes, but also authoritarian ones. The difference is in the modes of expression for
this multiplicity and in their legibility. 
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From the sociology of public spheres to the grammar
of common places
9 A diversity of opinion is one part of the classical definition of the public sphere as
formulated by Jürgen Habermas18. The applicability of this concept to socialist societies
has been the subject of controversy. At first glance, it seems paradoxical to speak of a
public sphere—or even to draw a separation between the private and the public—in
societies of  the Soviet  type.19 The very first  thing to note when thinking about the
binary public/private in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is the state’s interference
in all areas of life. From the point of view of the Bolsheviks, the private sphere deserved
no  autonomy ;  everything,  including  intimacy,  should  be  placed  under  the  vigilant
control  of  the collective.20 The term “private,” associated,  as it  was,  with bourgeois
society, was replaced by “personal.” (One spoke of “personal” rather than “private”
property  in  Soviet  society.)  The  “public”  was  identified  with  the  “common”  or
“communal.” And on this basis, at least in theory, in place of opposition, the public
versus the private,  stood complementarity,  the communal and the personal.21 Some
scholars have thus proposed terms such as “quasi public sphere” or “public privacy” for
Soviet‑type societies where, in their view, all the typical traits of the public sphere‑
freedom of expression, open debate, and the opportunity to influence politics—were
absent.22 
10 A related tendency in the historiography relevant to our interest in communications
has been to insist upon the distinction between “official” and “unofficial” cultures in
socialist states. In the Soviet context, Jeffrey Brooks offered a sweeping analytical study
of  Pravda  as  the  best  example  of  what  he  called  “official  public  culture”  implicitly
distinguished from, and opposed to, an unofficial, private culture. Brooks described this
“official public culture” as “eclectic” but so “constricting” in its content, and so false as
to  be  damaging  to  the  development  of  Soviet  consciousness.  The  press  created  “a
stylized, ritualistic, and internally consistent public culture that became its own reality
and supplanted other forms of public reflection and expression.”23 Much of what we
might  call  the  “first  wave”  of  work  on  the  rock  music  and  youth  culture  under
socialism also relied on a distinction between an authentic unofficial sphere and a false
official one, as of course have many analyses of samizdat and dissent. These concepts
are in fact native to a Soviet/socialist context : the valorization of the “authentic” (the
“sincere”) and, by association, the equation of the unofficial with the real, was a central
operation of  the  post‑Stalinist  Thaw.  But  a  rallying cry,  however  compelling,  is  no
proof  of  analytical  validity.  As  more  recent  studies  of,  in  particular,  Brezhnev‑era
culture, have shown, the borders between official and unofficial socialist cultures could
be  porous  indeed.24 Lewis  Siegelbaum,  in  his  introduction  to  the  recent  collection
Borders of Socialism : Private Spheres of Soviet Russia, identifies a similar interplay in the
categories  of  public  and  private  themselves ;  in  place  of  two,  separate  spheres,
“hermetically  sealed” off  from one another  and perforce  in  opposition,  Siegelbaum
proposes the private “in dynamic, interactive tension with the public, itself understood
as a complex, multi‑layered category.”25
11 References to the bourgeois public sphere in work on socialist societies point to the fact
that many scholars see the concept in normative terms, as an ahistorical ideal‑type.26
Yet Habermas himself warns against this in the introduction to his book on the public
sphere,  cautioning readers that it  is  impossible to construct an ideal‑type from the
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public sphere as it manifested itself in the high middle ages. He distinguishes four types
of  public  sphere  corresponding  to  four  different  historical  moments :  1) the
representative public sphere of the high middle ages) ; 2) the bourgeois liberal sphere,
which was  literary  in  nature,  referring  to  a  public  of  individuals  who operated by
reason, tightly related to the reading practices and sociability of the Enlightenment ;
3) the  illiterate,  plebeian  sphere  that  rose  as  a  consequence  of  the  bourgeois
revolutions of nineteenth century, and ; 4) the condition of plebiscitary acclamation,
applicable to twentieth‑century societies, which is post‑literary, meaning dominated by
opinion in the absence of public discussion.27 
12 Historians of the USSR have sought to confront Soviet sources and empirical evidence
with the concept of the bourgeois public sphere, and as a result, two definitions of the
public sphere, narrow and broad, have been put forward. In the first, narrow definition,
the  public  sphere  is  equated  with  the  Soviet  concept  of  obshchestvennost´  (regime
activists  or  militants  meant  to  represent  “orthodox”  public  opinion).28 The  second,
broad  definition  concerns  a  multitude  of  practices  and  formal  and  informal  social
spaces (including corners of resistance and dissidence.)29 By addressing ourselves to the
last part of Habermas’s argument devoted to the decline of the bourgeois public sphere,
we can reconcile these two definitions and distinguish three types of public sphere in
socialist  societies :  1) a  public  sphere  of  plebiscitary  acclamation,  purely  official  in
nature, corresponding to Soviet obshchestvennost´ ;  2) a semi‑controlled public sphere
that provided opportunities to outmaneuver control through the formal frameworks
that ensured its existence.30 (It was these semi‑controlled spheres that underwrote the
regime’s longevity. This was the realm of camouflaged critique, using coded language
and references accessible only to insiders.) 3) Pockets of opposition to the state that
were openly critical and illegal.31 
13 This issue of Cahiers presents three articles that utilize the concept of the public sphere.
Stephen Lovell associates it with the introduction of shorthand in Russia in the 1860s in
the context of the emergence of new institutions under Alexander II—zemstva and open
courts—that enlisted individual participation in political life. To document the spoken
word in print  form was something that  resonated with contemporary demands for
publicity.  Subsequently,  the  Bolsheviks  themselves  came  to  rely  heavily  on
stenographic  reports,  which  they  considered  important  mediating  instruments  in
public life. However, economic considerations worked in favour of minutes rather than
complete stenographic records, as did the growing practices of secrecy. Increasingly
corrected and censored, stenograms were transformed as a communications tool and
marginalized  from  central  decision‑making  practices,  notably  in  the  Politburo.
Ultimately, shorthand can be seen as a technology that put Bolshevik democracy to the
test.
14 Roman Krakovský interrogates the specificity of the socialist public sphere by studying
the  functions  of  the  local  council  in  a  small  Czechoslovak  city  on  the  outskirts  of
Prague.  In  particular,  he  is  interested  in  understanding  whether  this  institution
succeeded  in  conceptualizing  and  defending  an  idea  of  the  common  good.  His
conclusion is that it did not. Krakovsky shows that, despite the common practice of
writing  to  the  authorities  to  resolve  personal  problems  or  denounce  community
members,  public  participation  in  council  meetings  grew  increasingly  formal ;  the
individual  was subordinated to the collective,  and the meetings served above all  to
transmit  information  in  one  direction  and  to  mobilize the  population.  As  a  result,
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individuals grew ever more isolated from one another, and though alternative spaces
for  discussion and sociability  did exist,  they never managed to define the common
good. Fundamentally, as defined by the Czechoslovak communist party, the common
good  was  a  mechanism  for  increased  social  control  enacted  via  denunciations  and
shrinking individual autonomy.
15 Kirsten Bönker reaches very different conclusions in her study of television in the Soviet
Union.  By examining the summaries of  viewer mail  produced by Central  Television
professionals under late socialism, Bönker demonstrates the ways in which television
transformed  political  communication.  Even  if  only  3 %  of  viewers  wrote  to  the
television administration, their correspondence worked to justify the medium’s social
function in the eyes of the authorities. The author argues that television contributed to
the connection between the private  and public  spheres  in  so  far  as  the public,  via
programming,  entered  into  the  private  realm  and  nurtured  interpersonal
communications ;  at  the  same  time,  media  coverage  of  viewer  letters  to  Central
Television made private concerns public. According to Bönker, television contributed
to a sense of belonging and was for this reason a factor in the regime’s stability.
16 The difference in these two interpretations relates in part to the nature of the evidence
they use. Which sources can we access to study the diversity of public opinion ? Which
tools  can  we  use  to  generate  a  sociology  of  the  Soviet  public(s) ?  The  plebiscitary
acclamative sphere (as defined above) is the simplest to access because it is the best
documented  in  minutes  and  stenographic  reports  of  official  meetings.  The
semi‑controlled sphere demands greater ingenuity of the researcher ;  here we must
cross‑reference official sources related to the supervision of this sphere by party and
state  organs  with  less  formal  documents  often  located  in  personal  archives.  The
oppositional sphere is accessible via official documents relating to the persecution of
dissidents,  on  the  one  hand,  and  samizdat  materials  and  collections  of  personal
documents, on the other.
17 A  number  of  Soviet  historians  have  approached  the  problem  of  public  opinion  by
looking  at  rumors.32 Because  rumors  can only  spread widely  where  people  are  not
subdivided into separate enclaves, their dissemination offers a window on the nature of
any given society. At a macroscopic level, it is weak ties linking different communities
together that promote social cohesion. Individual social mobility helps build bridges
between  different  communities  provided  that  the  society  also  has  tools  for
communication across distances :33 “any message can reach a greater number of people
and cover a larger social distance (that is, route length) if it is transmitted via weak
links rather than strong ones.”34 But most works about rumor in the Soviet context rely
primarily on reports from the secret police (svodki) on the mood of the population—a
source with well‑documented analytical weaknesses.35
18 Other Soviet historians have utilized letters to the regime (pis´ma vo vlast´) as a means
to investigate popular moods. However, given that denunciations and complaint letters
were used by the authorities for repressive ends, enabling them to target supposed
enemies, the use of these letters as a source on public opinion has also been a subject of
historiographical debate. To be sure, although letters allow us to form some idea of the
variety of opinions in the population, they can only offer a restricted and partial view.
It was unusual for someone to feel so involved in the life of the country as to send a
letter to the authorities.36 Oleg Khlevniuk takes up the question of communication with
the regime by examining Stalin’s responses to the letters addressed to him personally.
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His  study  reveals  the  bias  of  Stalin’s  interests,  which  were,  he  finds,  limited  to
theoretical problems in Marxist‑Leninist ideology, expressions of political loyalty, and
messages from former acquaintances. Other types of letters were not put forward by
Stalin’s office for the General Secretary’s attention, and at best were used to compile
reports on the situation in the country and mood of the population. 
19 Opinion polls conducted in the late Soviet Union and comments books at exhibitions
have also been used to approach the problem of public opinion, though the sincerity of
the  responses  recorded  remains  something  of  an  open  question.37 Personal
correspondence—above all, correspondence between intimates—was less subject to the
need to conform to the conventions of official discourse, even in light of perlustration
practices :  censorship could motivate letter writers to adopt Aesopian language and
express themselves cautiously.38 In this issue, Kirill  Feferman’s article shows how one
Jewish family, the Ginzburgs of Rostov‑on‑Don, struggled to come to terms with the
contradictory information available in the press and the realm of rumor in 1941. He
brings out the impact of censorship on their correspondence in their use of formulaic
language about  the enemy and hope in  imminent  victory.  The repeated use  of  the
official discourse in the beginning and the end of letters, he suggests, was a technique
for mollifying the censors. 
20 It is possible to approach the problem of sources and public opinion differently if we
first question the Habermasian definition of the public sphere. According to Antoine
Lilti, the definition of the public sphere as something requiring the operation of critical
reason is
grounded entirely in a political ideal, that of public debate projected onto the Age
of Enlightenment, in order to better critique everything which takes its distance
from that ideal in our contemporary world.39 
In its  idealization of  the eighteenth century,  this  concept of  public  sphere leads us
astray  in  our  thinking  of  what  a  public  could  be.  In  his  study  of  celebrity,  Lilti
demonstrated that the public :
is not only a case of literary, artistic, or political judgment ; rather, it is a set of
anonymous readers who read the same books and, increasingly in the eighteenth
century, the same periodicals. The public is not formed by the exchange of rational
arguments,  but  rather  by  sharing  the  same  curiosities  and  beliefs,  by  being
interested in  the same things  at  the same time and by being conscious  of  that
simultaneity.40
21 This conceptual shift proves critical to overcoming the dichotomy between public and
private  in  socialist  states.  Considered  from  this  angle,  the  public  becomes  a  body
capable of exercising collective criticism (for or against the regime), but it is also a
province of mass culture, with its diversity of opinions. Individuals’ consciousness of
constituting  a  public—that  is,  of  sharing  the  same  interests  at  the  same  time—
stimulates mutual imitation and opens the door to mutual influence at a distance. The
role of mass media here is crucial because media circulate the messages and images
that contribute to constituting the public.
22 Soviet leaders were highly aware of the importance of the media. Regime change in
1917 was accompanied by a communications revolution that manifested itself first in
the distribution of the press throughout the country and, in time, in mass radio and
television  broadcasting.  The  Bolsheviks  considered  it  essential  to  provide  everyone
access to the official discourse, particularly with the aim of political education. To that
end, they put in place a variety of mechanisms, including extremely low pricing for
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periodicals (in relation to production costs). In the end of the 1920s, the rates were four
times lower than their pre‑war equivalents, while distribution volume was two and half
times  higher.41 Nevertheless,  the  history  of  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century
demonstrates  how  difficult  the  regime  found  it  to  cover  the  country  with
communication networks. In 1947, 65 % of the Soviet population lived in rural areas
that held less than 20 % of radio equipment. Some collective farms had no (wired) radio
speaker at all.  Similarly, the majority of Soviet villages were located more than ten
kilometres  from a  post  office,  complicating the  distribution of  newspapers.  Even if
political educators were doing their jobs, the fact is that regime discourse was far from
omnipresent in the countryside, which remained governed by mechanical solidarity (in
Durkheim’s definition) at least until the end of the Stalin’s rule. By contrast, as of the
1950s, we begin to see dynamics strongly favoring the consolidation of media publics,
most importantly, the shift from wired to wireless broadcasting, the influx of foreign
radio  broadcasting  in  the  USSR,  and  the  arrival  of  transistor  radio  and  then  of
television,  both of which enabled users to choose among programs to listen to and
watch.  Urbanization allowed ever increasing numbers of  people  to  access  mediated
mass culture. By 1970, radio had entered every Soviet home, with 95 million radio sets
across the country. While in 1950, the total number of television sets averaged out to
one per twelve thousand people, in 1970, the ratio was one per fifteen, and in 1980, one
per four42.
23 Mass  culture  is  tightly  linked  to the  creation  of  celebrities,  which  socialist  media
mastered  perfectly.  We  need  only  think  of  the  media  campaigns  around  Aleksei
Stakhanov,  Iurii  Gagarin  and  the  other  cosmonauts,  or  indeed  Nikita  Khrushchev,
whose press photographs from the 1950s and ‘60s are analysed in this issue by Ekaterina
Vikulina. Communication via celebrities is at the heart of the phenomenon of the media
public in socialist countries. Laurent Thévenot’s conceptualization of the grammar of
common  places  and  regimes  of  engagement  allows  us  to  better  understand  how
individuals  come  to  understandings  while  maintaining  their  different  opinions.
Common places are not obvious, and they are definitely not clichés ; they are instead
intermediate  objects—hero  figures,  emotionally‑charged  objects,  emblematic  scenes
from  literature,  poetry  or  theater—to  which  we  can  all  refer,  albeit  differently
according to personal affinities.43 Celebrities are the common places to which, while
maintaining our differences, we can attach ourselves, basically because these common
places are never opened up to critical evaluation and are never questioned. The success
of Soviet propaganda in the first half of the 1930s, as analysed by David Brandenberger
and Jeffrey Brooks,  was directly related to the abandonment of an abstract Marxist
discourse about anonymous social forces and the appearance in its stead of “ordinary
heroes” (Stakhanovites, pilots, etc.) in literature and film, which increased its impact
on individuals.44 People’s engagement with and personal investment in these common
places lent a personalized,  emotional character to communications.  This theoretical
prism can thus help resolve the conflict between support and resistance. In order the
understand the diversity of opinion at play within a single individual, we need to think
in terms of situated emotional engagements rather than duplicity. 
24 The articles by Christine Evans and Anna Fishzon in this issue can both be read through
this lens of socialist common places. Fishzon examines the subversive power of Soviet
children’s cartoons in the Brezhnev era. Censorship in this area was less stringent ;
artists found a niche where certain forms of criticism of Soviet reality could be allowed.
The cultural implications were important. Fishzon argues that cartoons deployed the
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values of the official ideology in such a way as to transform concepts of time and affect.
A  “queer  temporality”  focussed  on  the  present  and  on  desire  was  communicated
through the medium of cartoons, whose heroes became genuine common places for
Soviet viewers. 
25 As for Fishzon, the emotions elicited by the experience of cultural consumption are
central to Christine Evans’s work. Soviet television programs of the Brezhnev period—
in particular, the program Ot vsei dushi analysed here—were designed to engage every
viewer  on  a  personal  level  by  appealing  to  what  mattered  to  and  moved her.  The
portraits  of  ordinary heroes and heroines on screen were supposed to convey “the
Soviet way of life”—the slogan of the era. Veterans of the Great Patriotic War, “honest
Soviet workers,” and sovkhoz tractor drivers were all  emotionally charged common
places that created a sense of belonging to the same community. Soviet television’s
emotions were critical, argues Evans, because they “offered a way to mobilize and unify
in the absence of a convincing, overarching ideology.” 
 
Communications and the challenges of technological
innovation
26 Technological  innovation  was  inseparable  from  the  evolution  of  communications
practices  and  related  diversification  of  audiences.  The  symbolic  power  of  modern
media technologies,  in particular,  as interfaces between the self  and the social,  and
between the organic body and the machine, should not be underestimated. The Soviet
Union and the socialist  states of  Eastern Europe lauded technological  progress as a
domain  where  socialism  held  the  advantage.  In  practice,  the  introduction  of  new
technologies was not always straightforward and was the subject of debate between
specialists and the authorities. New technologies never entirely replaced old ones, and
this engendered an overlap in technological generations, or what David Edgerton has
called “the shock of the old.”45
27 Several articles in the issue address the question of communications and technological
innovation.  Angelina  Lucento shows how figurative painting was able  to  preserve its
status as a premier visual medium under socialism in the face of the rising prominence
of  photography  in  the  late  1920s  and  early  1930s.  Painting’s  presumed  emotional
impact  on  viewers  was  in  producing  collectivist  feelings—“an  ocean  of  feeling”
connecting  different  members  of  society,  which  photography  was  thought  not  to
match. These critiques of photography stimulated its evolution.  The new developed
thanks to the old, in a kind of permanent competition. The reproduction of paintings
by  mechanical  means  developed  in  reaction  to  the  rapid  spread  of  photographic
technology.
28 Ekaterina Vikulina’s article resonates with Lucento’s in that it examines photography’s
transformation in  the  1950s  and ‘60s  as  a  result  of  the  medium’s  appropriation by
amateurs and the influx of western imagery. Both the amateur and the western photo
influenced  the  shooting  technique  of  Soviet  professionals,  who strove  to  introduce
greater intimacy with the subjects they photographed for the press, including party
and state leaders, Nikita Khrushchev in the first instance. In press photographs, Soviet
leaders now looked as if they had been taken off guard, and this worked to increase the
emotional impact of the shots —a phenomenon we have already encountered in the
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studies of television and cartoons. Unlike photographs from the Stalin era, which were
carefully staged and retouched prior to publication, Thaw‑era shots were valued for
their  presumed  spontaneity,  sincerity, and  truthfulness.  Technological  innovation
remained  a  central  concern  because  to  achieve  these  effects  required  modernizing
typographical equipment and cameras.
29 According  to  Vikulina,  photographs  of  Khrushchev  talking  on  the  telephone
symbolized the connection between Soviet power and the people. The article by Larissa
Zakharova considers the functions of telecommunications in the Soviet Union at the end
of  the  Second  World  War.  The  decision  of  Soviet  leaders  to  modernize
telecommunications  technologies  in  the  Soviet  Union  with  the  help  of  western
companies dated to the mid‑1920s. Their determination stemmed from both a desire
for confidentiality and the need to rule an immense territory spanning two continents.
In their view, communications technologies were tools of governance and of territorial,
social, and economic control. The stakes attributed to local telephone service evolved
over  time :  in  the  1920s,  the  urban  telephone  was  associated  with  technological
progress  and  claimed  social  significance ;  as  of  the  beginning  of  the  1930s,  this
communications tool  was supposed to lead the campaigns for  the organization and
management  of  the  kolkhoz.  In  this  way,  although  the  historiographical  cliché
maintains  that  authoritarian  regimes  never  encourage  the  development  of  the
democratizing  tool  that  is  the  telephone  because  it  involves  reciprocal  exchange
(unlike the telegraph, which is a first‑rate tool of command), the Soviet leadership did,
in fact, encourage the development of the telephone in its social uses. 
30 We can discern a specific chronology in conceptions of the telephone’s purpose in the
Soviet period. In the first period, from the revolution until 1925, telecommunications
are considered primarily as instruments of government. During a period of territorial
conquest,  telecommunication  tools  must  respond  above  all  to  political  needs.  The
phone is a public tool insofar as it contributes to the management of the public sphere,
which itself pertains to the state. By a decree of May 6, 1920, individual telephones
could be expropriated for the use of state and party leaders and institutions. Private
telephone use was now limited to free public devices available only if the lines were not
in use by party‑state institutions. The number of subscribers in the country declined
from 232,337 in 1917 to 126,870 in 1921 (an average, then, of one telephone per one
thousand people).46
31 The  signing  of  a  technical  assistance  contract  with  Ericsson  in  1926  marked  the
beginning  of  the  second  period,  when the  great  Soviet  cities  were  supposed  to  be
transformed into showcases of socialism thanks to the democratization of automatic
telephony. Social‑ and thus private‑telephone usage came to the fore. In 1926‑27, the
bulk of urban lines was located in large cities : Moscow (48,000 subscribers), Leningrad
(41,000),  Khar´kov  and  Kiev  (almost  5000),  Baku  (4600)  and  Rostov‑on‑Don  (3600).
Altogether, subscribers in these cities represented 51 % of subscribers nationwide.47
32 In 1934, collectivization and the rise of National Socialism in Germany brought another
shift in goals : connecting kolhozes and defense institutions to telephone networks was
the new priority. Thus, once again, the telephone was a public tool. What is remarkable
in  this  third  period  is  that  the  technical  choice  made  in  favor  of  an  innovative
technology,  Ericsson,  was  suddenly  questioned.  After  a  series  of  trials  and  of
controversy, punctuated by the repression of engineers and technicians, a new choice
was made in favor of an automatic, step‑by‑step Siemens telephone system (which was
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actually an older technology than the Ericsson rotary mechanical  system.)  In other
words, in the USSR, where political power applied pressure and intervened violently,
technological  developments  could  not  proceed  in  a  linear  fashion.  Reversals  were
possible, following changes of benchmarks and reorientations in policy about priorities
in usage.48
33 The  Second  World  War  highlighted  the  problem  of  innovation  in  the  realm  of
telecommunications in the USSR. The direct transfer of interwar German telephone and
telegraph equipment as war booty actually hindered progress in the postwar Soviet
Union : it created a ten‑year gap with western countries, which had begun to deploy
much more advanced technologies.49 These postwar transfers primarily benefitted the
country’s administrative apparatus, as Larissa Zakharova demonstrates in her article
about the inclusion of western Ukraine in the Soviet communication networks. Direct
telephone lines between the capital of the USSR and major Ukrainian cities offered a
means of control that bypassed the republic‑level authorities. This control imperative,
coupled with the goal of political education in the annexed territories, ensured that the
western regions received “privileged treatment” in the provision of technology and
equipment.  The seizure of  goods and equipment that  accompanied the inclusion of
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  in  the  Soviet  bloc  did  not  occur  in  Western  Ukraine.
Telecommunications technologies were expected to establish Soviet political authority
in these areas, while preserving their image as “prosperous regions” in the eyes of their
residents.
34 In  the  Soviet  Union,  telephony  was  again  officially  understood  in  social,  relational
terms in the 1970s, the fourth developmental period. Until that time, the telephone was
conceived of as an administrative tool above all, available in cities, in elites homes, in
communal housing or in public phone booths. The authorities strove to increase the
number of booths, thereby confirming their utilitarian vision of the medium. However,
individuals often subverted this goal and turned every available telephone into a tool of
private sociability. 
35 Negotiations on the purpose of  communication tools  also emerge in Patryk Wasiak’s
work. Using a social construction of technology approach, this author is interested in
the research, design, and development of computer networks in socialist Poland rather
than in the social implications of technological innovations. The existence of several,
parallel  networks  projects  (intended  for  economic  management  and  control,  the
transmission of data among researchers in nuclear science, and social communication)
challenges the Western conception of early IT networks as a “closed worlds” closely
tied to the paradigm of the Cold War.  It  was the imagination of  technical  progress
under socialism that helped to encourage horizontal communications.
36 The history of communications and their technologies can open up new avenues for
thinking about the social, the political, and the cultural in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. New research on the worlds of both media professionals and ordinary media
consumers  directs  our  attention  to  the  emotional  experiences  at  the  heart  of  the
communications phenomenon, and thus to a far more complex relationship between
the private and the public, the personal and the political than is often considered. The
seeming  social  consensus  associated  with  socialist  regimes  covered  many  forms  of
engagement  with  socialism’s  common  places.  The  superficially  static  and  obtuse
propaganda state belied a diverse, dynamic public.
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